The Gulf’s shallow waters favour the use of moored and bottom mines, increasing the risk of unintentional damage to the seabed cable infrastructure during minelaying operations. Tehran has employed sea mines in the Gulf to disrupt cargo ships and oil tankers, a tactic later also used by the Yemeni Houthi militia in the Red Sea. Should Tehran target the Gulf’s undersea cables, the IRGCN’s structure and capabilities could be adapted for such actions.Ĭable disruptions might also result as a collateral effect of Iran’s mine warfare. While Tehran’s regular navy (IRIN) operates through large, aging high-end capabilities, the IRGCN has specialised in using fast, small platforms, optimised for minelaying as well as hit-and-run operations. Iran’s IRGC Navy (IRGCN) matches the low-cost attack requirements. Remarkably, in 2013 the Egyptian Coast Guard arrested three divers who were trying to cut a cable off the coast of Alexandria, a striking example of cheap threats to the network. In the Gulf, high-end technical submarine requirements are further reduced by its shallow sea, which reaches a depth of a maximum of 100 meters. Cheaper forms of attacks can be carried out with naval mines, maritime improvised explosive devices (MIEDs), low-profile submersible vessels, and even divers. Yet, a Russian-kind naval force with high-end capabilities is not indispensable for cable sabotage operations. The ship’s activities have, in some cases, coincided with temporary connectivity disruptions in the neighbouring countries, causing concern in security and defence policymakers. For instance, since 2015 the Kremlin’s ‘Yantar’ spy ship was tracked loitering near undersea cables off the coasts of Cyprus, Israel, Syria, Iran, and Ireland. However, NATO and EU officials are increasingly wary of sabotage operations, particularly by Russia. The subsea network is subject to disruptions, most of which are caused by unintentional human activities and natural disasters. Remarkably, Tehran’s subsea network is almost entirely linked to the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia, with state-to-state cables with Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE.

On the other side of the Gulf, Iran’s subsea cable network is relatively limited, with only 6 cables landing on Islamic Republic’s coast. Besides 2Africa, which circumvents the African continent, all the other routes reach the Mediterranean by crossing the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The new route will connect the two countries with Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the UK.

Bahrain and Kuwait will be connected to Europe in 2023, when the longest cable in the world, 2Africa, will be operational. At present, (2022), there are 8 cables delivering data to both the GCC and Europe, with 4 more to enter service by 2024. The networks of Bahrain and Kuwait are almost exclusively tied to other Gulf states, with the exceptions of the ‘Kuwait-Iran,’ ‘GBICS’, and ‘FALCON’ cables, which link them to Iran and India, among others. Of those, the GCC countries are connected to 33 cables, with Saudi Arabia being the most served country (21), followed by the UAE (19), Oman (17), Qatar (7), Bahrain (5), and Kuwait (5). There are only 59 cables connected to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

NATO and the European Union (EU) have underlined the challenges sabotage operations pose to the network and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are particularly vulnerable given the acute threats posed by state and non-state actors and the essential interconnection of Gulf and Red Sea submarine cables are soft targets with tremendous spillover effects globally.Įurope is served by 186 cables (active or in service by 2025). Securing the network is crucial for global security. Such infrastructure enables the majority of global economic activities, diplomatic communications, and military operations. Over 500 submarine cables carry about 95% of the world’s Internet data, conveying some €10 trillion in financial transactions every day. The key to global connectivity lies at the bottom of the sea.

Telegeography submarine cable map 2020